管理层薪酬、股权激励与上市公司盈余管理研究
首发时间:2007-05-30
摘要:本文选取2003-2005年非金融类上市公司数据为样本,采用修正的横截面Jones模型计算可操控性应计利润,来衡量上市公司的盈余管理程度。在此基础上,对管理层薪酬、股权激励和上市公司盈余管理之间的关系进行实证研究。在对公司规模、资产负债率和管理费用加以控制后,本文研究发现:(1) 管理层薪酬与盈余管理之间不存在显著的相关关系,管理层为增加个人薪酬水平而进行赢余管理的动机不明显;(2) 我国上市公司的股权激励制度刺激了管理层的盈余管理行为,管理层持股比例越高,上市公司盈余管理程度越高。
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A Study on Management Compensation, Stock Option Incentives and Earnings Management of Listed Companies
Abstract:This paper uses the Discretionary Accruals calculated by the Modified Jones Model to appraise the earnings management, then examines systematically the relationship between the management compensation, stock option incentives and earnings management through empirical study, using the non-financial listed companies’ data from 2003 to 2005. By controlling the asset scale, assets liabilities ratio and administrative expenses, the analysis reveals that: (1) There isn’t a significant relationship between management compensation and earnings management; (2) The stock option incentive system stimulates the manager for earnings management. The higher percent of manager stock option makes the higher earnings management.
Keywords: Management Compensation, Stock Option Incentives, Earnings Management
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No.1315212058911805****
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