不完全信息下的专利投资
首发时间:2007-12-24
摘要:本文考虑不完全信息和竞争,建立实物期权投资决策模型,分别得到了单个企业和双寡头企业投资专利所需的临界信念,并进一步分析了两对称企业竞买同一个专利可能出现的均衡类型及产生条件。结果表明,竞争的力量和专利固有的“赢者通吃”特性不仅使得投资所需临界信念降低,由领导者投资后所产生的信息披露效应从而带给追随者的后发优势也将不复存在;同时,出现错误投资决策的概率也随之增大;企业间的竞争均衡可能会出现占先均衡和同时投资均衡。
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Patent Investment under Incomplete Information
Abstract:This paper considers incomplete information and competition, and the establishment of investment decision-making model of the real option, and receives the critical belief needed for patent investment from single enterprise and duopoly enterprises respectively, and further analyzes the equilibrium types and generation conditions may appear from the competition purchases to a same patent between two symmetric enterprises. The result shows that the power of competition and inherent characteristic of patent, the “winner takes all”,not only leads the critical belief needed for investing patent decreases,but also the follower’s second mover advantages usually caused in “information spillover effect” generated by the leader’s investment won’t be existenced; Simultaneity,the probability of a wrong decision increases with it; The competition equilibrium among the enterprises can result in preemption equilibrium and simultaneous investment equilibrium.
Keywords: incomplete information, patent investment, option games, preemption equilibrium
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No.1732017913211984****
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