效率工资及员工管理的博弈
首发时间:2009-04-02
摘要:介绍现代经济学中的效率工资问题,在经纪人假设基础上,把企业与员工之间的雇佣关系看成是一种博弈关系,他们都是参加博弈的直接当事人,都是博弈决策主体和策略的制定者,作为有理性的经济主体,双方都是从各自利益最大化出发的。文章运用重复博弈模型提出了量化效率工资模型,并重新构建了博弈模型对员工与企业部门主管之间的行为进行分析,揭示出“激励的悖论”,最后对博弈模型做进一步说明。
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The Game of Efficient Wages and Staff Management
Abstract:Introducting efficient wages of modern economics, on the base of agent assumption that, view the employment relationship between enterprises and employees as a game, they are both the direct parties in the game, and are both the main decision and strategy makers. As rational economic entities, the two parties are maximizing their own interests. This passage uses repeated game model to propose the quantity efficiency wage model,and rebuilds the game model to analyse the behaviors between the staff and the director of the department ,reveal the phenomenon of “incentive paradox”,and finally does a further explanation to the game model.
Keywords: Effiencent wage Game Staff managemen
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