不完全信息背景下海外并购的风险与规避——基于博弈论的观点
首发时间:2009-08-11
摘要:在金融危机背景下,中国众多本土企业海外并购的热情增加,纷纷采取抄底行为。但在信息不完全的情况下,海外并购也面临着巨大的风险。本文旨在通过博弈论方法,比较完全信息和不完全信息下并购收益的差别,提出不完全信息下跨国并购的风险,并进一步指出分散海外并购风险的各项有效措施。
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Applying Game Theory to Evaluate Risk Aversion of Cross-border M&A under Incomplete Information Background
Abstract:In the context of financial crisis, a large number of Chinese local enterprises increase the enthusiasm of cross-border M&A and have taken acts hunters. However, in the case of incomplete information, they have to face enormous risks. This article intends using the methods of game theory, to compare the difference earnings between complete information and incomplete information, and proposes the risk of cross-border M&A under incomplete circumstance, and then further points out some effective measures to spread risk of cross-border M&A.
Keywords: Cross-border M&A Risk Game Theory
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No.3441147921412499****
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