风险规避的非公平规避经理人最优报酬契约实验研究
首发时间:2012-11-20
摘要:已有的研究将非公平规避因子引入传统的委托-代理模型,推理分析了模型的均衡解。然而一项未被实验验证的理论是不完整的,本文运用z-Tree实验经济学软件编写实验程序,操控了实验室动态联机行为委托-代理博弈实验,考察了在不同风险规避度和非公平规避度的组合下,参与人选择理论最优解的显著性。实验结果显示股东在95%水平的置信区间显著的选择了理论的最优薪酬合同,经理人在95%水平的置信区间显著的选择了理论的最优努力水平,而且他们在95%水平的置信区间显著的同时选择了理论的最优薪酬合同和努力水平;实验中股东和经理人表现出较强的学习效应。
关键词: 风险规避 非公平规避 经理人 最优报酬契约 实验研究
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The experimental research about the executive compensation contract of the manager with different inequity-averse degree and different risk-averse degree
Abstract:The existing research pulled inequity-averse in the traditional principal-agent model and analyzed the model's equilibrium solution. However, a theory is not completed that is not verified by experiment, so this article used the experimental economics software of z-Tree by programming experimental procedure to control dynamic online principal-agent game experiments in laboratory and investigated the significance of subjects' choosing the optimal solution under the combination of different degree of risk-averse and disadvantage inequity-averse. Experiment results show shareholders significantly choose the optimal theoretical compensation contract at 95% level of confidence interval, and managers significantly choose the optimal theoretical effort at 95% level of confidence interval, and they simultaneously significantly choose the optimal theoretical compensation contract and he optimal theoretical effort at 95% level of confidence interval. Moreover, shareholders and managers behave a strong learning effect in our experiment.
Keywords: risk averse inequity averse manager executive compensation contract experimental research
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