基于进化博弈论的矿工不安全行为演化规律研究
首发时间:2013-03-12
摘要:本文基于进化博弈理论,构建了"矿工--安全监管者"和"矿工--矿工"之间的博弈模型,通过对模型的求解和分析,探寻矿工不安全行为的演化规律,研究发现:①安全监管者和工友的安全力度和矿工的不安全行为负相关;②不安全行为的成本和矿工的不安全行为负相关;③矿工群体中安全行为矿工的比例和不安全行为负相关。为煤矿企业控制矿工的不安全行为,减少人因事故提供了一定的方法指导和理论依据。
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Research on Evolution Rule of Miners' Unsafe Behavior Based on Evolutionary Game Theory
Abstract:In this paper,based on the evolutionary game theory builds the miners and safety supervisors as well as miners and miners' game model. Based on the analysis of the game model , find the evolution rule of miners' unsafe behavior. From the study fund that :①It is negative correlation between miners' unsafe behavior and safety regulators and workers safety intervention efforts ; ②It is negative correlation between unsafe behavior and behavior cost;③It isnegative correlation between miners' unsafe behavior and the proportion of safe behavior group .Finally, the study provides some method guidance and the basis theory for the coal mine howt to do to control the coal miners' unsafe behavior and reduce the accidents due to human factors.
Keywords: safety management;evolution rule;evolutionary game theory unsafe behavior
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