经理人公平偏好对管理防御行为影响的实验研究
首发时间:2017-05-16
摘要:现代公平偏好理经理人公平偏好对管理防御行为影响的实验研究论的相关博弈实验研究表明,公平偏好对人的决策行为起着至关重要的作用,而在企业中,经理人的公平偏好是无法直接观察和测量的。因此,为了解决经理人的代理道德风险问题,本文基于公平偏好理论,通过实验研究方法探讨了经理人横向公平偏好与纵向公平偏好对经理管理防御行为的影响,结果表明:公平偏好对经理人决策行为的影响十分显著。经理人薪酬公平性越差,其管理防御程度越大。当经理人薪酬与股东收益差距较大时,高能力经理人表现出较高的敏感性;当经理人与经理人市场薪酬差距较大时,低能力经理人表现出较高的敏感性。研究结论可为企业通过公平性的激励机制来抑制经理管理防御行为提供理论依据,降低企业委托代理成本。
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The effect of fairness preference on managerial entrenchment
Abstract:The related experimental studies of game based on fairness preference theory have shown that fairness preference plays a very important role in human behavioral decision. However, in the enterprise, we can't study the managerial entrenchment under the fairness incentive mechanism directly through empirical research methods since fairness can not be directly observed or measured. Thus, in order to solve the manager's agent moral hazard problems,based on fairness preference, the paper experimentally investigated the effect of the manager's vertical and horizontal fairness preference on the managerial entrenchment respectively. The results indicated that managers have fairness preference indeed. The worse managers compensation fairness becomes, the greater the degree of managerial entrenchment. A large pay gap between managers and shareholders results in a higher sensitivity in high-ability managers while a large pay gap between managers and managers marketing leads to a higher sensitivity in low-ability managers. Thus,the results can provide reliable theoretical basis for the enterprise to bring more benefits to both sides of the contract by reducing the agency cost.
Keywords: fairness preference managerial entrenchment curve estimation experimental study
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No.4732490119922514****
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