经理管理防御、股权激励与企业风险承担
首发时间:2017-05-11
摘要:基于"代理人风险规避假说与风险追逐假说",经理人行为可分为风险规避和风险承担两种,对经理管理防御与企业风险承担水平之间的关系和影响机理进行研究,然后考察了股权激励对两者关系的调节作用。研究结果表明:经理管理防御程度越强,企业风险承担水平越低,说明经理人为了保持自身职位和个人利益最大化,表现出更多的风险规避行为;管理层股权激励对经理管理防御对企业风险承担水平的影响关系存在正向调节效应,且股权激励程度越高,该调节效应越明显。本文研究丰富了经理管理防御与企业风险承担领域的研究文献,通过股权激励,能够激励经理人选择风险承担行为,提高企业风险承担水平。
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Managerial Entrenchment, Equity Incentive & Corporate Risk Taking
Abstract:Based on "the hypothesis of agent risk aversion and risk chase", Manager's behavior is divided into risk aggressive or risk conservative behavior, the paper study the relationship and influence mechanism about managerial entrenchment and enterprise's risk taking, and discuss the equity incentive's adjustment effect in the relationship. The results show that: managerial entrenchment reduce the corporate risk taking, showing more risk aversion behavior, in order to maintain the stability of CEO's jobs and wealth. Its mean that managerial entrenchment is one of the important factors that affect the corporate risk taking. Managerial equity incentives have a positive correlation with risk taking, and have an marked adjust effect in the relationship of managerial entrenchment and the corporate risk taking. With the increase of the intensity of the equity incentive, the impact of the manager's management on the risk taking of the enterprise will be significantly decreased. This study enriches and expands the research about managerial entrenchment and risk taking, using equity incentives to motivate managers choose aggressive behavior and to improve enterprise risk level.
Keywords: managerial entrenchment risk taking stock incentives
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No.4732658119987314****
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