管理防御对企业现金持有决策影响方向的研究
首发时间:2017-10-06
摘要:本文实证研究不同超额现金持有方向和产权性质下,管理防御对现金持有决策方向的影响,以及投资者保护对管理防御与超额现金持有关系的调节作用。研究发现,无论企业正向或负向超额持有现金,防御的管理者都更倾向于积累现金,仅当企业正向超额持有现金时,投资者保护才能有效地约束企业管理者的管理防御行为;与民营企业相比,国有企业管理防御对现金持有决策的影响程度更大;在国有企业中投资者保护无法有效降低其管理防御对现金持有决策的影响;在民营企业中,与负向超额持有现金企业相比,投资者保护对正向超额持有现金企业的管理防御行为约束更强。
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The Influence of Managerial Entrenchment on Corporate Cash Holding
Abstract:The article studied how managerial entrenchment influenced corporate cash holding under different directions of excess cash holding and different property rights, examined the moderating effect of investor protection. The result showed that no matter corporate had positive or negative excess cash holding, the higher managerial entrenchment was, the more cash managers accumulated. Only in those corporates which had positive excess cash holding, investor protection could constraint managerial entrenchment. Compared with private enterprises, managerial entrenchment influenced excess cash holding more significantly in state-owned enterprises. Investor protection could not constraint managerial entrenchment in state-owned enterprises. Among private enterprises, the moderating effect of investor protection was stronger in those companies which had positive excess cash holding.
Keywords: business administration managerial entrenchment excess cash holding investor protection
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