综合管廊PPP项目入廊激励机制博弈研究
首发时间:2018-03-19
摘要:综合管廊PPP项目在我国的起步较晚,在实践过程中,由于管线单位存在现有直埋管线和对管廊的认识不足,使得其对缴费入廊产生抵触情绪。在这种情况下,现有的收费定价机制已不足以满足管线单位的入廊意愿,需要在定价机制中加入管线单位入廊激励机制的设计,以促使管线单位做出缴费入廊的选择。本文建立了项目公司与管线单位之间的"激励-入廊博弈模型",并应用博弈理论的方法对模型进行了讨论。通过模型分析得出,奖励额度和惩罚力度的提升并不总能促使管线单位入廊,奖励额度越小、惩罚力度越高,越有利于促使管线单位缴费入廊。
关键词: 工程管理 综合管廊 PPP项目 管线入廊 激励机制 博弈
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The Incentive Mechanism for Entry of Utility Tunnel PPP Project by Using Game Theory
Abstract:Due to late start of utility tunnel PPP project in China, there are many pipelines underground and a lack of awareness of the utility tunnel to pipeline companies, which makes it incompatible with entry into the utility tunnel. In the circumstances, the existing pricing mechanism is not enough to meet the willingness of the pipeline companies to enter the utility tunnel. So a incentive mechanism for entry is added to the pricing mechanism to urge pipeline companies to choose the entry. A game model between project company and pipeline company is established about incentive and entry in this paper. Combined with the equilibrium solution of the model,the incentive mechanism is researched and analyzed. The analysis results show that increasing the amount of rewards and punishment could not always motivate pipeline companies to choose the entry. The smaller the amount of rewards, or the higher the punishment, is the more conducive to motivate pipeline companies to choose the entry.
Keywords: Engineering Management utility tunnel PPP project Pipeline-into-UT incentive mechanism game theory
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