孤立微电网中"边用边弃"现象的博弈模型
首发时间:2019-01-10
摘要:本文提出一种关于微电网能量管理问题的博弈模型并介绍其在孤立微电网中的应用。该模型主要针对电力供应与需求间不协调的问题("边用边弃"现象),给出了功率调节策略和充放电策略。此外,由于充放电策略与补贴政策有关,因此本文还研究了两类补贴政策对"边用边弃"现象的影响。笔者运用驻马店温泉电站的实际数据进行实验,结果表明: 1)无储能装置时,可转移负荷比例的增加可以缓解但不能解决"边用边弃"问题。此时,电力补贴政策无法缓解"边用边弃"问题。2)有储能装置时,实施基础设施补贴政策,可以解决"边用边弃"问题。
关键词: 管理科学与工程 孤立微网运行 补贴政策 斯塔克尔伯格博弈
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A Game Model for "Demand & Abandon'' Phenomenon In Isolated Microgrid
Abstract: This paper presents a game model about a microgrid energy management problem and its implementation in the centralized energy management system for isolated microgrids. The model mainly provides power regulation strategies and charging and discharging strategies for the situation that the power generation and consumption are imbalanced ("Demand & Abandon" phenomenon). Besides, we also study the impact of two types of existing subsidy policies on "Demand & Abandon'' problem in the operation of microgrid. We conduct experiments on the real data from Zhumadian hot spring power station, and the results show that 1) without energy storage devices, "Demand & Abandon'' can be alleviated with the increase of the percentage of shiftable load. However, the electricity subsidy policies are invalid for "Demand & Abandon''. 2) With energy storage devices, the implementation of infrastructure subsidy policies can solve "Demand & Abandon''.
Keywords: Management Science and Engineering Operation of Isolated Microgrid Subsidy Policies Stackelberg Game
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