分析师关注会刺激真实盈余管理吗?-- 一个文献综述
首发时间:2019-03-18
摘要:盈余管理一直是学术界的研究热点。相比于应计盈余管理,真实盈余管理具有隐蔽性,会使企业偏离正常的经营活动,更可能损害企业的未来盈利能力和价值。现有文献通常认为分析师关注会促使管理层减少应计盈余管理,转向更隐蔽的真实盈余管理。这些文献缺少对于分析师监督机制严谨而深入的研究,没有对分析师、外部审计师、法律法规等不同监督主体的监督机制进行区分,实证设计也存在一些缺陷,导致结果存疑。因此,文章试图对该领域的现有相关研究成果进行梳理,并对未来的研究方向和研究方法提出建议。
关键词: 会计学 分析师关注 应计盈余管理 真实盈余管理 监督机制
For information in English, please click here
Can analyst coverage constrain real earnings management?--A Literature Review
Abstract:Earnings management has always been a hot research topic. Compared to accrual earnings management, real earnings management is more likely to directly damage the company\'s future profitability and values, which is more hidden and makes firms deviate from normal operational activities. Prior literature document that analyst coverage will drive managers to reduce accrual earnings management and move to more real earnings management. The result is not exactly correct, due to the lack of strict research on detecting channel and blameless research design. They do not distinguish the supervision subjects among different supervision subjects, such as analysts, external auditors, laws and regulations. Therefore, this paper tries to sort out the existing relevant literature in this field, and puts forward some suggestions for the future research direction and methods.
Keywords: Accounting Analyst coverage Accrual earnings management Real earnings management Supervision mechanism
引用
No.****
动态公开评议
共计0人参与
勘误表
分析师关注会刺激真实盈余管理吗?-- 一个文献综述
评论
全部评论0/1000