Research on Dual Channel Coordination Based on Different Power and Pricing Strategies

• 1、College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University,Tianjin 300072

Abstract：With the rapid development of e-commerce, retailers have opened up online and offline dual channels for product distribution. In the context of this retailer's dual channel, there are two very relevant factors related to final product pricing: power structure and pricing strategy. The two factors are combined to obtain three pricing scenarios: 1) decentralization, and 2) concentration of power. + Unified pricing, 3) Power concentration + Discrimination pricing. This paper considers three pricing scenarios, from the perspective of a retailer with online and offline dual channels, to study its optimal pricing strategy and the coordination mechanism under the low-profit strategy. By constructing the Stakelberg game model, this paper mainly obtains the following three conclusions. First, discriminatory pricing is not always beneficial to retailers. When the competition intensity coefficient between channels is relatively strong, or the size of the underlying market is relatively large, the retailer's unified pricing strategy is superior to the discriminatory price strategy under decentralization. Second, retailer profits increase with the store experience factor and the intensity of competition between the two channels. Finally, under the three pricing scenarios, retailers can always obtain higher profits under the concentration of power + discriminatory pricing. This paper designs a "revenue sharing + online preferential" mechanism to achieve supply chain coordination.

Keywords： Dual channel power structure pricing strategy channel coordination