双重委托代理下公司激励机制研究
首发时间:2019-12-31
摘要:大部分公司在管理上通常分三个层次,即公司所有者、管理者和普通员工,这其中包含了双重委托代理关系。通过双重委托代理模型可以发现,由于公司所有者和管理者不知道相应代理人付出的努力程度,因此委托人希望提高激励程度后代理人能够更加努力,但是代理人风险规避度越大,激励力度也越容易被抵消,从而代理人也就越不会更加努力。与此同时,拥有双重身份的管理者总要承受相应的风险。
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Research on the incentive mechanism of the company under the dual principal-agent
Abstract:Most companies are usually divided into three levels in management, that is, owners, managers and ordinary employees, which includes the dual principal-agent relationship. Through the dual principal-agent model, it can be found that because the owners and managers of the company do not know the efforts of the corresponding agents, the principal hopes that the agents can work harder after the incentive level is increased, but the greater the risk aversion degree of the agents is, the easier the incentive intensity is offset, so the agents will not work harder. At the same time, managers with dual identities always bear corresponding risks.
Keywords: managerial economics double principal-agent Incentive mechanism game analysis
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