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期刊论文
信任、忠诚与家族主义困境*
《管理世界》(月刊)2002,(6):87~95,-0001,():
d in different aspects, there is no definition of TRUST that is aimed at depicting the cultural system characteristic of China, as opposed to the Western definition. In order to comp rehend accurately the TRUST structure under the circumstances of Chinese culture, it is necessar y to divide TRUST into social and individual. The social t rust is founded on law and legal contracts, while private trust is an evolutionary process based on trust administ ration and coordinative games among individuals or organizations. Compared with the Western developed market economy, China lacks social trust while she has more private trust of which the market is cutapart, in ot her words, it is a “difference sequence st ruct ure” wit h discrimination against out siders and in favor of insiders. In this article, this special trust structure is defined as “TRUST of CLANN ISHNESS”. Different from the Western general trust based on CONFIDENCE, this trust of clan system is built on LO YAL T Y. It can be discerned that, if described with Bryan’s coordinative games, the clannish trust may result in the optimum Pareto Coordinative game, which can better solve the trust problem in agency. The clannish trust, however, cannot, or can hardly untangle problems of the lack of agent ability-the problems that crop up with the organizational scale or trade complexity increased, which are called CLANN ISHNESS DEL EMMA in this paper. And under special trade circumstances, the mana gement by trust, as a choice made when the time is opportune, is determined, under the conditions of the specified cultural system, by the managerial cost structure
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