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张昭

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期刊论文

Game-Theoretic Design of Optimal Two-Sided Rating Protocols for Service Exchange Dilemma in Crowdsourcing

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arXiv,2018,(): | 2018年03月03日 | arXiv:1712.09848

URL:https://arxiv.org/abs/1712.09848v1

摘要/描述

Despite the increasing popularity and successful examples of crowdsourcing, its openness overshadows important episodes when elaborate sabotage derailed or severely hindered collective efforts. A service exchange dilemma arises when non-cooperation among self-interested users, and zero social welfare is obtained at myopic equilibrium. Traditional rating protocols are not effective to overcome the inefficiency of the socially undesirable equilibrium due to specific features of crowdsourcing: a large number of anonymous users having asymmetric service requirements, different service capabilities, and dynamically joining/leaving a crowdsourcing platform with imperfect monitoring. In this paper, we develop the first game-theoretic design of the two-sided rating protocol to stimulate cooperation among self-interested users, which consists of a recommended strategy and a rating update rule. The recommended strategy recommends a desirable behavior from three predefined plans according to intrinsic parameters, while the rating update rule involves the update of ratings of both users, and uses differential punishments that punish users with different ratings differently. By quantifying necessary and sufficient conditions for a sustainable social norm, we formulate the problem of designing an optimal two-sided rating protocol that maximizes the social welfare among all sustainable protocols, provide design guidelines for optimal two-sided rating protocols and a low-complexity algorithm to select optimal design parameters in an alternate manner. Finally, illustrative results show the validity and effectiveness of our proposed protocol designed for service exchange dilemma in crowdsourcing.

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