周永务
库存控制与管理;物流与供应链管理;运筹与优化;市场营销等。
个性化签名
- 姓名:周永务
- 目前身份:
- 担任导师情况:
- 学位:
-
学术头衔:
博士生导师, 教育部“新世纪优秀人才支持计划”入选者
- 职称:-
-
学科领域:
管理理论
- 研究兴趣:库存控制与管理;物流与供应链管理;运筹与优化;市场营销等。
周永务,1964年生,现为合肥工业大学管理学院物流与供应链管理研究所所长。1985年本科毕业于安徽师范大学数学系,1987年硕士研究生毕业于西北工业大学应用数学系,2002年毕业于合肥工业大学管理学院管理科学与工程专业,获博士学位。2000、07~2001、01在新加坡国立大学计算机学院从事合作研究,2002、10~2003、09在香港城市大学管理科学系从事合作研究。1995年破格晋升为副教授、1998年破格晋升为教授,2003年受聘为管理科学与工程一级学科博士点博士生导师,是近20余种国内外期刊的审稿专家。主要研究方向有:库存控制与管理;物流与供应链管理;运筹与优化;市场营销等。主持或参加研究了国家自然科学基金项目5项、参研国家自然科学基金重点项目1项(第三)、国家863计划1项(第二)、省部级以上科研课题7项。在IIE Transactions、European Journal of the Operational Research、International Journal of Production Economics、Computers & Operations Research、Journal of the Operational Research Society以及《系统工程理论与实践》等国内外权威期刊上发表学术论文90余篇,合作出版专著《智能决策方法与智能决策支持系统》(撰写其中第七章)。曾荣获国家科技进步二等奖(第五)安徽省自然科学奖二等奖(第二)、IIE Transactions最佳论文奖、霍英东教育基金会高校青年教师奖三等奖等省部级以上奖励7项,其博士论文被评为2005年全国百篇优秀博士论文,2005年入选教育部“新世纪优秀人才支持计划”。
-
主页访问
2066
-
关注数
1
-
成果阅读
671
-
成果数
16
【期刊论文】Supply-chain coordination under an inventory-level-dependent demand rate
周永务, Yong-Wu Zhou a, *, Jie Min a, b, Suresh K. Goyal c
Int. J. Production Economics 113 (2008) 518-527,-0001,():
-1年11月30日
In this paper, we consider coordination issues of a distribution system composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer offers a single product to the retailer and the demand for the product at the retailer's end is stock dependent. We focus on three aspects of the resulting supply chain. First, we discuss the manufacturer-Stackelberg game structure to determine how the manufacturer sets the wholesale price of the product and how the retailer in turn determines the order quantity. We assume that both the parties share relevant cost information. Then we develop a simple profit-sharing mechanism that would ultimately achieve perfect channel coordination. Finally, the manufacturer is provided with a quantity discount scheme to induce the retailer to increase the order quantity so as to maximize the manufacturer's profit. We show that this discount scheme also achieves the perfect coordination of the whole channel. Numerical examples are used to illustrate the models.
Supply-chain coordination, Inventory-level-dependent demand, Profit-sharing mechanism, Quantity discount
-
43浏览
-
0点赞
-
0收藏
-
0分享
-
96下载
-
0评论
-
引用
周永务, Amy Hing Ling Lau a, Hon-Shiang Lau b, *, Yong-Wu Zhou c
Int. J. Production Economics 113 (2008) 425-445,-0001,():
-1年11月30日
A "manufacturer" supplies a "staple" product to a large number of "retailers" having very different sales volumes. Many models have considered how the "manufacturer" should design a quantity-discount (QD) scheme to induce the retailers to order in larger batch sizes. Our models differ from most existing ones in three aspects. First, we consider situations with a much larger number of retailers. Second, our manufacturer does not need to coordinate her replenishment cycles with those of the retailers. Third, besides "QD" schemes, we also consider "handling-charge reduction" ("HCR") schemes (i.e., a retailer pays a lower handling charge if his order is sufficiently large). We develop models and solution procedures for designing QD and HCR schemes that maximize the manufacturer's expected gain. We consider schemes with one as well as two "price breaks" (i.e., order size (s) needed to qualify for a QD or HCR). Examples of noteworthy characteristics revealed by our analytical and numerical analyses are (i) an optimal QD scheme will have a high enough price break such that extremely few retailers will be big enough to get a "free" discount and (ii) an optimal HCR scheme produces practically the same magnitude of expected total gains as an optimal QD scheme.
Quantity discount, Handling-charge reduction, Supply chain contracts, Order incentives
-
33浏览
-
0点赞
-
0收藏
-
0分享
-
83下载
-
0评论
-
引用
【期刊论文】Pricing Coordination in Supply Chains through Revenue Sharing Contracts
周永务, Yong-Wu Zhou, Shanlin Yang
Information and Management Sciences Volume 19, Number 1, pp. 31-51, 2008,-0001,():
-1年11月30日
In a decentralized supply chain, local decision-makers at different echelons of the supply chain usually pursue their own maximizing-profits. However, a decision that is locally optimal could be globally inefficient. Through the revenue sharing mechanism, this paper proposes a supply-chain contract model to coordinate the pricing decision in a multi-echelon supply chain with a deterministic price-sensitive demand. We identify the conditions under which the contract can achieve channel coordination as well as improve the profits of all the supply chain members, and also present how to modify the contract parameters so as to more evenly share the profit along the chain.
Decentralized Supply Chain,, Revenue Sharing Contract,, Pricing Coordina-tion.,
-
28浏览
-
0点赞
-
0收藏
-
0分享
-
77下载
-
0评论
-
引用
周永务, Shan-Lin Yang a, *, Yong-Wu Zhou b
Int. J. Production Economics 103 (2006) 104-116,-0001,():
-1年11月30日
This paper considers the pricing and quantity decisions of a two-echelon system with a manufacturer who supplies a single product to two competitive retailers. A Stackelberg structure is assumed between two echelons in the two-echelon chain, in which the manufacturer who acts as a leader declares her wholesale price to both retailers and the duopolistic retailers who act as followers set their sale prices and associated order quantities independently under the manufacturer's pricing scheme. The paper analyzes the effects of the duopolistic retailers' different competitive behaviors-Cournot, Collusion and Stackelberg-on the optimal decisions of the manufacturer and the duopolistic retailers themselves. The results indicate that: (i) among the three scenarios, the duopolistic retailers' action in collusion makes the retailers charge the highest sale price while the duopolistic retailers' Cournot behavior results in the lowest pricing of the retailers; (ii) the more drastic the duopolistic retail market competes, the higher the manufacturer's and the duopolistic retailers' pricing should be; and (iii) the total profit of the duopolistic retailers who act as the followers will exceed the more powerful manufacturer's profit as long as the degree of dissimilarity between the duopolistic retailers' market demands is large enough.
Two-echelon supply chain, Pricing, Game theory, Retailing
-
112浏览
-
0点赞
-
0收藏
-
0分享
-
141下载
-
0评论
-
引用
周永务, Shan-Lin Yang a and Yong-Wu Zhou b
Intl. Trans. in Op. Res. 13 (2006) 143-168,-0001,():
-1年11月30日
This paper considers a two-echelon channel in which a monopolistic manufacturer supplies a single product to multiple heterogeneous retailers who are in separate markets. The present paper studies the problem of how the manufacturer in a manufacturer-Stackelberg game designs a unified quantity-discount pricing scheme to improve the whole channel's profit as well as each partner's profit. Considered in the paper are two types of unified quantity-discount pricing schemes: the regular quantity-discount pricing scheme and the incremental volume discount pricing scheme. Each of the two types of schemes includes a single pricebreak discount policy and a non-linear quantity discount policy. Optimal solutions are derived and numerical examples presented to illustrate the efficiency of each discount policy.
discount pricing, two-echelon supply chain, price-sensitive demand, Stackelberg game
-
29浏览
-
0点赞
-
0收藏
-
0分享
-
100下载
-
0评论
-
引用
周永务, Zhou Yongwu
Journal of Systems Engineering and Electronics, Vol.13, No.4, 2002, pp.39~45,-0001,():
-1年11月30日
In the integrated production-shipment models for the single vendor-single-buyer system presented hitherto, the demand rate of items is treated as a constant. However, many researchers have observed that the presence of more quantities of the same product tends to attract more customers. This suggests that the demand rate should depend on the stock level. This paper presents a single-vendor-single-buyer production-shipment model with the stock dependent demand rate, based on the demand rate linearly depending upon the stock level at any instant of time.
Production,, Shipment,, Stock dependent demand.,
-
131浏览
-
0点赞
-
0收藏
-
0分享
-
16下载
-
0评论
-
引用
周永务
,-0001,():
-1年11月30日
-
37浏览
-
0点赞
-
0收藏
-
0分享
-
101下载
-
0评论
-
引用
【期刊论文】Optimal production and shipment models for a single-vendor–single-buyer integrated system
周永务
,-0001,():
-1年11月30日
-
38浏览
-
0点赞
-
0收藏
-
0分享
-
198下载
-
0评论
-
引用
【期刊论文】A stochastic and asymmetric-information framework for a dominant-manufacturer supply chain
周永务
,-0001,():
-1年11月30日
-
45浏览
-
0点赞
-
0收藏
-
0分享
-
70下载
-
0评论
-
引用
周永务
,-0001,():
-1年11月30日
-
44浏览
-
0点赞
-
0收藏
-
0分享
-
110下载
-
0评论
-
引用