The most important step in the reform of state-owned onterprises in China is to restructure the unitary state-owned and state-managed property right. This proparty right reform is the first and key step in the state-owned enterprises’ institutional change, but it isn’t the last and sole important step. After the first step in the property right reform, what can do in the further reform governments different levels as the main concrete operating body? What is the gain or loss for governments? And which characteristics has their behavior? This paper has made an analysis based on the reform of medium and small-sized state-owned enterprises in Zhucheng city, Shandong provcnce as a case and on some principles of new institutional economics as a means. The reform in this countv-level city was selected as a case because of the following reasons: the first is the large scope and the great effect of the reform; the second is its value to study the large drop of the status and the role of governments in the reform; and the third is the enterprises’ institutional change in Zhucheng continued after the state property right has been fundamentally restructured, so it is worthy to be further followed and studied.

本文结合中国和其他一些转型国家市场化改革的经验事实，提出并验证了关于制度变迁的三个新的理论假说：（1）同一轨迹上制度变迁的边际收益先递增递减，其变化轨迹呈倒“U”型曲线；（2）政府行政力量推动市场化改革在一定时期内是可行的，有效的；（3）制度变迁中不同主体的角色定位和转换主要取决于制度变迁对各自利益的影响，也受制于其他因素。

本文运用计量和统计分析的方法, 对1949 —1978 年中国大陆农业生产效率进行实证分析。分析结果表明, 在不同的土地产权制度下, 所激励的生产要素投入量不同, 从而农业总产出有较大不同; 在投入相同的生产要素和政策要素下, 农业的产出也有不同。综合比较后认为: “所有权农民私有、合作或适度统一经营”是相对较好的制度。因为在这种制度下, 能较大程度地激励各生产要素的投入, 土地和劳动等要素的利用率也较高, 从而使农业总产值高速而稳定增长。

本文通过对上市公司融资结构的描述,认定中国上市公司存在强烈的股权融资偏好;公司股权融资的成本大大低于债务融资的成本是股权融资偏好的直接动因,深层的原因在于现行的制度和政策。强烈的股权融资偏好对公司融资后的资本使用效率、公司成长和公司治理、投资者利益以及宏观经济运行等方面都有不利影响,应该采取相应的对策。文中提出了一些政策建议。