According to the socialist market economy, the incentive model of MEMS is studied based on the hierarchical decision-making system of governmentmarket- firm. The relevant strategy is also analysed. The article is composed of two parts. The first part includes: a system analysis of the general framework of socialist market economy and the corresponding macro-management system; and incentive strategy, as an effective means in MEMS. Part two includes: by means of the hierarchical decision-making theory, and the stochastic optimization theory, two concrete static models with a perfect information structure and partial information structure respectively, where the government induces Pareto-optimality by adopting a strategy which is a function of the fiscal policy parameter; the existence of the optimum affined strategy in the above models is tested.

While energy is a required factor in any kind of economic activity, most environmental problems, such as acid rain precipitation, greenhouse-gas emissions, and exhaustion of nonrenewable resources, seem to be related to overuse of primary energy. It is therefore important to consider energy within the framework of an integrated analysis of natural resources, economy, and the environment. In recent years, many scholars have studied this issue (see, for example, Balistreri & Rutherford, 2000; Jiang, 2002; Lin & Polenske, 1995; Xu et al.,2002; Zhang & Folmer, 1997) in the light of different but traditional input-output models. One kind of theoretical green input-output table, focused on energy, is designed on the basis of our Green Input-output Accounting Framework of Natural Resources-Economy- Environment. Scenario forecasting and analysis for China in 2020 are made. Coal used, without further transformation, mainly for power generation, is the major source of SO2 and CO2 emissions in China, and it will remain so without changes to the final and intermediate demand structures.

The paper extends the Malmquist productivity index to establish a theoretical model to evaluate foreign direct investment (FDI) attractiveness. This model and its implementation mechanism consider cost efficiency and profit efficiency changes that represent the influence of price level on inputs and outputs respectively. Using data from China from 1997 to 2008, we assess the attractiveness of FDI in terms of human capital stock, material capital stock, energy consumption situation, and degrees of market openness. We use data envelopment analysis to find the bottleneck of FDI attractiveness and to identify the potential market of each province. This study contributes to the literature by providing sound investment advices to multinational corporations. It also offers policy advice and guidelines to developing nations for setting policies and programs to attract FDI. Specifically, our results provide useful inputs for policy makers to create a mechanism design to attract FDI in the host country.

The study of joint advertising channels decision-making is a very difficult issue. It mainly focuses on ads investment game between a manufacturer and a retailer in a vertical supply chain. With the rise of the game theory, scholars have been starting to investigate this issue in the frame of game theory in recent years. The paper improves the existing mod-els and introduces single-period and multi-period modified models. The paper obtains the closed-form solutions to the single-period model and the simulation results of the multi-period model. We also examine the implications of these results and obtain some insights into the real practice.

In this paper, under a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and multiple retailers, we investigate vertical and horizontal information sharing in different channel structures and the manufacturer’s choice on whether or not to keep a direct channel. To this end, we first study the dual-channel structure where uncertain demand is a linear function of price with a generalised-distribution base demand and show that the retailers have incentives to share information horizontally but not vertically, while the manufacturer is better off with vertical information sharing but its expected profit is not affected by horizontal information sharing. We next examine the retail-channel structure and find the basic results remain unchanged. Finally, we provide closed-form internal and external conditions under which the manufacturer can benefit from owning a dual-channel structure. Our study extends the existing literature by combining information sharing and dual-channel choice, introducing channel difference, discussing the impact of channel structure on horizontal and vertical sharing as well as providing interesting managerial insights for channel choice.