本文中的策略性劳动分工模型解释了为什么人们有时不选择分工，并造成社会产出损失。由于在高技能部门里存在“干中学”效应，低技能者如果背离比较优势而从事高技能部门的生产，就可以在未来分享劳动分工收益的过程中获得更高的谈判地位，甚至可能逆转自己的比较优势。然而，这种个人理性的选择却可能导致社会的产出损失。这个模型的一个意外而合理的含义是，在策略性的劳动分工决策中，如果未来一期由交易关系瓦解而造成的损失足够小，那么，交易成本的减少也可能导致当期分工的恶化。但我们的模型也包含了交易成本下降可能促进分工这一既有理论中的特殊情况。这个模型有助于理解在国际贸易、国内区域间分工和家庭内分工中广泛被观察到的低效率现象及相应的政策。

本文从分权式改革的视角提供了一个自洽的逻辑框架，全面地分析了中国的发展道路。这个逻辑框架不仅能够分析中国前期改革的成功，也能够解释目前浮现的诸多社会经济问题。政治集权下的经济分权给地方政府提供了发展经济的动力，尤其是完成了地方层面的市场化和竞争性领域的民营化。但是，内生于这种激励结构的相对绩效评估又造成了城乡和地区间收入差距的持续扩大、地区之间的市场分割和公共事业的公平缺失等问题。由于中国的渐进式分权改革在很大程度上可以看作一个中央政府主导和控制下的机制设计问题，所以，在认清中国分权式改革的得失的基础上，正确地设计合理的改革方略，对于下一阶段改革的成功是至关重要的。如此，中国就可能走出一条独特的大国发展道路。

Using survey data of enterprises and entrepreneurs from Liuzhou, Guangxi, China, the determinants of political participation of private enterprises are studied. We find (1) entrepreneurs who are older or from larger older enterprises have a higher probability of becoming members of the People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, while gender, education and household registration status do not significantly affect their political participation. (2) Entrepreneurs with membership in the Communist Party of China or other parties have a higher probability of entering politics. Compared with Communist Party members, those of other parties have a much higher probability of political participation. (3) Parental leadership identity increases entrepreneur probability of entering politics. Its effect is between that of Communist Party membership and other party membership. This paper provides evidence that Chinese entrepreneurs in private enterprises are translating their economic power, political identity, and household ackground into formal political power.

This paper argues that the conventional approach of data averaging is problematic for exploring the growth-inequality nexus. It introduces the polynomial inverse lag (PIL) framework so that the impacts of inequality on investment, education, and ultimately on growth can be measured at precisely defined time lags. Combining PIL with simultaneous systems of equations, we analyze the growth-inequality relationship in postreform China, finding that this relationship is nonlinear and is negative irrespective of time horizons. Journal of Comparative Economics 34 (4) (2006) 654-667. The World Institute for Development Economics Research, Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, Fin-00160, Helsinki, Finland; Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, People’s Republic of China.