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周永务, Shan-Lin Yang a and Yong-Wu Zhou b
Intl. Trans. in Op. Res. 13 (2006) 143-168,-0001,():
-1年11月30日
This paper considers a two-echelon channel in which a monopolistic manufacturer supplies a single product to multiple heterogeneous retailers who are in separate markets. The present paper studies the problem of how the manufacturer in a manufacturer-Stackelberg game designs a unified quantity-discount pricing scheme to improve the whole channel's profit as well as each partner's profit. Considered in the paper are two types of unified quantity-discount pricing schemes: the regular quantity-discount pricing scheme and the incremental volume discount pricing scheme. Each of the two types of schemes includes a single pricebreak discount policy and a non-linear quantity discount policy. Optimal solutions are derived and numerical examples presented to illustrate the efficiency of each discount policy.
discount pricing, two-echelon supply chain, price-sensitive demand, Stackelberg game
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【期刊论文】Optimal production and shipment models for a single-vendor–single-buyer integrated system
周永务
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-1年11月30日
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【期刊论文】A stochastic and asymmetric-information framework for a dominant-manufacturer supply chain
周永务
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-1年11月30日
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周永务
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-1年11月30日
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周永务
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-1年11月30日
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