We study the dependence of incentives for product innovation on the presence, or absence, of parallel trade. The common assertion is that the presence of parallel trade lowers the incentive for product innovation. Our results support this assertion for some parameter values. However, there are cases in which the presence of parallel trade increases research intensity. For this to occur the innovating firm must already produce and export another good. Further, the new good and the old must be close substitutes and have different transportation costs.

文章建立了一个两期数学模型，其中一个耐用品厂商有可能还拥有一种非耐用品。基于这个模型，文章讨论了厂商对其耐用品的出租或销售偏好。结果发现，这种非耐用品的存在可以改变厂商对其耐用品的出租或销售行为，厂商喜欢出租而不是销售其耐用品这个经典结论并不一定成立，最终结果既取决于这两种产品之间的关系，又取决于这种非耐用品的存在时期。

内容提要基于一个生产高质量产品的企业与一个生产低质量产品的企业进行古诺竞争的双寡头模型，本文分析了提高产品质量的技术如何转让以及技术转让与企业兼并之间的关系。我们的研究表明：就技术转让而言，拥有技术的企业总是偏好特许权收费方式。在固定收费方式下，技术转让可能不会发生；但是如果发生，那么此时的社会福利达到最大。而技术转让与企业兼并相比，拥有技术的企业更偏好企业兼并，但是从社会福利的角度来看，兼并有损社会福利。

In this paper, we develop a location-quantity model of mixed oligopoly where a welfare-maximizing firm competes against multi-store profit-maximizing firms. We show that agglomeration of private firms occurs in a circular market regardless of the number of stores of the public firm. Whether or not equidistant location patterns exist depends crucially on the number of stores of the public firm. If the public firm has a single store, then nonequidistant location pattern arises. However, if the public firm has two stores, then under the assumption of quasi-symmetric location patterns, equidistant location pattern is the outcome in equilibrium.

内容提要国有企业改革是一个历史过程，因此国有企业改革要遵循历史与逻辑相统一的“历史逻辑”。国有企业的产权改革必须置于历史形成的既有的“宪法”的规范下才能寻找到“产权改革”的真正的“历史逻辑起点”。从这个意义上说，单纯的寻利性的产权改革会面临合法性危机从而导致整个改革的合法性危机。国企改革的合法性意味着改革的始点必须公平，一旦满足了这个条件，产权交易的寻利过程会内生出各种所有制企业，则转轨后的经济就是“混合经济。”