农地制度（包括农地所有制、农地使用制和农地国家管理制度等）是一项重要的社会经济制度，从古今中外农地制度改革与农村经济发展的研究分析看, 农地制度及其改革与农村经济发展存在着相互促进、相互制约的辩证关系。

本文认为，中国北方农户“水改旱”行为的直接经济诱因是农户旱作作物和稻谷种植收益成本的对比。单位面积收益、劳动力、地租、资本、地势和水电费支出对农户作物选择行为有不同影响。为了获得更高的收益，农户会选择种植蔬菜等高收益旱作作物。灌区水分配中的高成本，是农户“水改旱”的一个重要原因。改善灌区管理，提高灌区水供给保证率，是缓解灌区水田面积下降趋势的重要举措。

Although China has reduced its poor population from 250 million in 1978 to 30 million in 2003, an overall reduction in world poverty still depends on progress being made in China because of its huge population. The concentration of poor in western rural regions makes China s task of poverty alleviation complex. Clearer and more transparent analyses on the reasons for poverty are essential prerequisites of any development policy that puts poverty reduction at its heart. The purpose of this paper is to identify causes for being poor in western rural China. It argues that the essence of rural income poverty in the western region is water poverty. Low efficiency of agricultural productivity resulting from poor land quality and uneven distribution of water resources has led to heavy dependence on irrigated agriculture. Irrigated agriculture has played and will play a critical role in creating employment opportunities and alleviating poverty. Existing water shortages and competition for different water utilization make it imperative to enhance the efficiency of water resource management.

中国灌溉农业发展面临的主要问题是农业水资源利用的低效率，表现为短缺与浪费并存。指出干旱缺水是中国粮食产量波动的主要原因，阐述水资源产权模糊、水价偏低、水工程设施产权模糊、分散的水行政管理以及农民用水过程中自主管理组织的缺乏是中国灌溉农业水资源利用效率低下的成因。对此，提出构造实施资源水利的制度环境、完善水资源管理制度、完善水资源政策、促进灌区水市场发展等提高灌溉管理效率的措施是未来中国灌溉农业发展的核心问题。

What are the factors impeding or enhancing cooperative behavior amongst farmers in Chinese irrigation district maintenance? This paper argues that economic inducement mechanisms can enhance farmers' cooperative behavior in ID management, especially under the background of being lack of self-organization. The Nash equilibrium solution of cooperative behavior amongst farmers is derived. Given the amount of other farmers' maintenance effort, the factors influencing farmer i's cooperative behavior are classified into two groups-endogenous factors and exogenous factors. The endogenous factors are expected income achieved from irrigated agriculture and geographical location along an irrigation canal. The exogenous factors are the importance of the consumption of private goods relative to the use of the irrigation infrastructure, collective goods, and the price of collective goods. The influence of each factor is analyzed. Economic inducement mechanisms are shown to be crucial for the emergence of cooperative behavior amongst farmers in an ID. Dividing farmers within an ID into different water user associations can help to overcome strategic behavior in ID management, providing technical support, establishing compensation mechanisms and establishing land-transferring mechanisms can induce more maintenance effort.