本文认为用水者协会和供水组织风险态度是决定灌区资产剩余控制权安排的主要因素，用水者协会和供水组织的灌区资产剩余控制权份额随其风险厌恶程度的提高而降低、灌区资产剩余控制权安排内在于水生产过程本身，是资产剩余控制权安排收益和成本对比的结果。只要灌区资产折旧对用水者协会灌区维护努力水平和供水组织生产努力水平的敏感程度不为零，灌区资产的联合拥有是灌区资产剩余控制权安排的合理选择。建立经济自立灌区和用水者协会不应该是灌区管理体制改革的终极目标，解决灌区资产剩余控制权权属是灌区管理体制改革的核心。

在一些著名经济学家的产权理论的基础上，对水权的定义及水权的界定问题进行思考，并对我国水权界定现状进行分析，指出我国目前在水权界定方面存在的问题：水资源所有权还不能完全得到实现；水资源使用权的界定还存在一定的弊端；水资源收益权还得不到良好的保证；水资源转让权还没有取得合法地位。提出完善我国市场经济条件下的水权界定的一些建议：加强水资源费征收力度，促进水资源所有权的真正实现；用市场机制明确界定水资源的使用权，促进水资源优化配置；建立合理的水资源价格形成机制，保证水资源收益权的良好运行；使水资源转让权合法化，初步建立水资源转让制度。

目前我国对食物安全的认识在以下几方面存在偏差：食物安全与粮食安全的关系，地区间、国际间比较优势与食物安全的关系。对食物安全认识上的偏差，导致政府政策制定与食物安全目标之间存在着一定的不一致性。在现阶段经济发展条件下只有矫正思路，充分利用国内国际两个市场、两种资源，发挥区域比较优势，才能实现高水平的食物安全。

What are the factors impeding or enhancing cooperative behavior amongst farmers in Chinese irrigation district maintenance? This paper argues that economic inducement mechanisms can enhance farmers' cooperative behavior in ID management, especially under the background of being lack of self-organization. The Nash equilibrium solution of cooperative behavior amongst farmers is derived. Given the amount of other farmers' maintenance effort, the factors influencing farmer i's cooperative behavior are classified into two groups-endogenous factors and exogenous factors. The endogenous factors are expected income achieved from irrigated agriculture and geographical location along an irrigation canal. The exogenous factors are the importance of the consumption of private goods relative to the use of the irrigation infrastructure, collective goods, and the price of collective goods. The influence of each factor is analyzed. Economic inducement mechanisms are shown to be crucial for the emergence of cooperative behavior amongst farmers in an ID. Dividing farmers within an ID into different water user associations can help to overcome strategic behavior in ID management, providing technical support, establishing compensation mechanisms and establishing land-transferring mechanisms can induce more maintenance effort.