This paper applies the infra-marginal analysis, which is a combination of marginal and total cost-benefit analysis, to a model with both constant returns and increasing returns in production. It demonstrates that as transaction conditions are improved, the general equilibrium discontinuously jumps from autarky to partial division of labor with a dual structure, then to the complete division of labor where dual structure disappears. Two types of dual structure may occur in the transitional stage of economic development and globalization. One of them involves the division of labor in the developed economy and autarky in the less developed economy, generating increasing disparity of per capita real income between the two types of economies. The other involves a domestic dual structure in the less developed economy, where the population is divided between commercialized sector which trades with foreign country and self-sufficient sector which is not involved in trade. All gains from trade go to the developed economy. This paper shows that deterioration of a country's terms of trade and an increase of gains that this country receives from trade may concur, provided productivity progress from an expanded network of division of labor outpaces the deterioration of terms of trade. In the model with both endogenous and exogenous comparative advantages, a country may export a good with exogenous comparative disadvantage if endogenous comparative advantage dominates this exogenous comparative disadvantage. Implications of the findings for China's WTO membership and China's trade policy are explored.

根据超边际分析法分析既有外生比较优势又有内生比较优势的李嘉图模型，随着交易条件的改进，一般均衡结构必然会从自给自足不连续地跳到具有二元结构的部分分工，然后再跳到完全分工，此时二元结构消失。

提出科教兴国战略的目的是通过加大对科学研究和教育的投入来达到振兴国家的目的。本文运用经济模型从理论和经验两个方面证明了加大对科学研究和教育的投入能够促进经济的不断增长，而经济的不断增长能带动政治和文化诸方面的不断进步和发展，从而达到振兴国家的目的。

This paper applies the inframarginal analysis, which is a combination of marginal and total cost-benefit analysis, to investigate the relationship between division of labor, the extent of the market, productivity, and inequality of income distribution. The model with transaction costs and exogenous and endogenous comparative advantages shows that as trading efficiency is improved the general equilibrium discontinuously jumps from autarky to partial division of labor with a dual structure, then to the complete division of labor where dual structure disappears. In this process different groups of individuals with different trading efficiency get involved in a certain level of division of labor at different stages of development. As the leading group gets involved in a higher level of division of level, leaving others behind dual structure emerges and inequality increases. As latecomers catch up dual structure disappears and inequality declines. When the leader goes to an even higher level of specialization, dual structure occurs and inequality increases again. Inequality decreases again as the latecomers catch up. Hence, the equilibrium degree of inequality fluctuates in this development process. The relationship between inequality and productivity is neither monotonically positive nor monotonically negative. It might not be of inverted U-curve. The key driving force of economic development and trade is improvement in trading efficiency.

This paper applies the inframarginal analysis, which is a combination of marginal and total costbenefit analysis, to investigate the relationship between division of labor, the extent of the market, productivity, and inequality of income distribution. The model with transaction costs and exogenous and endogenous comparative advantages shows that as transaction conditions are improved, the general equilibrium discontinuously jumps from autarky to partial division of labor with a dual structure, then to the complete division of labor where dual structure disappears. In this process different groups of individuals with different transaction conditions get involved in a certain level of division of labor at different stages of development. As the leading group gets involved in a higher level of division of level, leaving others behind dual structure emerges and inequality increases. As latecomers catch up dual structure disappears and inequality declines. When the leader goes to an even higher level of specialization, dual structure occurs and inequality increases again. Inequality decreases again as the latecomers catch up. Hence, the equilibrium degree of inequality fluctuates in this development process. The relationship between inequality and productivity is neither monotonically positive nor monotonically negative. It might not be of inverted U-curve. The key driving force of economic development and trade is improvement in transaction conditions.

文章利用一个简单的一般均衡贸易模型分析国际产业转移问题，给出了发生转移的条件，以及这种转移对输入国和输出国的工资和福利的影响。

本文通过对重庆钢铁集团的案例研究，揭示企业绩效与产权制度之间的内在关系，并解释为什么一些没有进行产权制度改革的竞争性国有企业能够成功，而很多产权明晰的私有企业为什么会失败。本文揭示，企业家激励、企业家能力，以及正确的决策是企业取得良好绩效的充分条件。产权明晰的私有企业具有内在的企业家激励机制和企业家生成机制，其失败的主要原因在于决策失败，而国有企业由于不具备这些机制产生的制度保证，其失败更可能同时来自于企业家缺乏激励、企业家能力不足以及决策失败等多方面的原因。虽然国有企业可以通过企业家自我道德激励和模仿私有企业的产权激励来建立起企业家激励机制，但这些机制具有偶然性和不可持续性，而明晰的产权制度则能为这些机制提供具有自我执行（self-enforcing）功能的制度保证。

We propose a Neo-Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade that combines comparative endowment advantage, comparative technological advantage, international capital mobility, and trade-specific transaction costs. Unlike competing characterizations, our model is the first of its kind to treat specialization in production endogenously using an inframarginal general equilibrium setting. The results are startling! They suggest that production within the diversification cone-a key assumption of Heckscher-Ohlin theory that is required for its core propositions (such as factor price equalization) to hold – may only prevail on the razor’s edge, or under exceptional circumstances. In addition, our findings nominate a mechanism by which improvements in transaction efficiency facilitate international trade thereby stimulating cross-country division of labor. Contrary to other generalizations of the Heckscher-Ohlin (such as the various derivatives of the Kemp-Jones model of trade), our model does not assume a purely Ricardian character: comparative endowment advantage may determine the pattern of trade even in the presence of opposing technological differences, as long as total factor productivity coefficients adjusted for transaction efficiency and factor intensity do not confer unambiguous comparative (technological) advantage. Still, "efficiency intensity"-adjusted comparative technological advantage supersedes factor endowments in determining the flow of trade.