本文结合中国和其他一些转型国家市场化改革的经验事实，提出并验证了关于制度变迁的三个新的理论假说：（1）同一轨迹上制度变迁的边际收益先递增递减，其变化轨迹呈倒“U”型曲线；（2）政府行政力量推动市场化改革在一定时期内是可行的，有效的；（3）制度变迁中不同主体的角色定位和转换主要取决于制度变迁对各自利益的影响，也受制于其他因素。

本文讨论在两经济主体的合作能够产生剩余的情况下,这些剩余如何在他们之间进行分配。以往研究提出了分配问题的几个可能的解,并对解的存在性和唯一性进行了讨论。但他们的分析或是直接对解用不可验证的公理进行描述;或是对个体偏好强加一些不可验证的假设,然后得到存在性或唯一性的结论。作者发现,运用类似于博弈论中多个策略均衡点存在时“聚点”决定解的唯一性的分析方法,可以得到这样的结论:实际中多个解都可能存在,不同问题的不同解是由社会习俗决定的;即便是同一个问题,由于社会习俗的不同,也可能有不同形式的解;并且解的大小及其变化与社会习俗互有影响。接下来,作者以悬赏广告为例,对悬赏广告中悬赏金的大小进行求解。我们发现用前面的结论可以比较好地解释所得到的结果。另一方面,得到的结果在一定程度上也可以验证前面的结论。

The most important step in the reform of state-owned onterprises in China is to restructure the unitary state-owned and state-managed property right. This proparty right reform is the first and key step in the state-owned enterprises’ institutional change, but it isn’t the last and sole important step. After the first step in the property right reform, what can do in the further reform governments different levels as the main concrete operating body? What is the gain or loss for governments? And which characteristics has their behavior? This paper has made an analysis based on the reform of medium and small-sized state-owned enterprises in Zhucheng city, Shandong provcnce as a case and on some principles of new institutional economics as a means. The reform in this countv-level city was selected as a case because of the following reasons: the first is the large scope and the great effect of the reform; the second is its value to study the large drop of the status and the role of governments in the reform; and the third is the enterprises’ institutional change in Zhucheng continued after the state property right has been fundamentally restructured, so it is worthy to be further followed and studied.